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Every U.S. company, public or private, that conducts operations out-
side of the United States should devote serious consideration to creating and
implementing an Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA" or "Act") compli-
ance program. In this context, an "FCPA compliance program" means a
single, documented, corporate plan designed to reduce the likelihood that
the company will engage in violations of the anti-bribery provisions of the
FCPA, and to detect such violations and bring them to the attention of sen-
ior management, if they occur.' A well-designed compliance program has
obvious importance in educating employees concerning their responsibili-
ties in this complex and perilous area and in thereby protecting the com-
pany from the potential costs, liabilities, and reputational damage associated
with violations of a high-profile, criminally-enforceable federal statute. In
addition, a developing body of law suggests that corporate directors have a
duty to assure that compliance programs reasonably designed to the risks of
the business are in place, rather than merely attempting to deal with mis-
conduct after it arises.
2
This article outlines the process by which an FCPA compliance pro-
gram may be structured for a multinational company. The article first
* B.B.A., University of Wisconsin 1969; J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School,
1974. Mr. Goelzer is a partner in the Washington office of Baker & McKenzie.
'In enacting the FCPA, Congress also sought to curb bribery by preventing companies
from creating off-the-books funds or other devices to conceal the use of corporate assets for
improper purposes. Section 102 of the Act (Section 13(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934) requires public companies to keep accurate books and records and to devise and
maintain adequate systems of accounting controls. See generally Daniel L. Goelzer, The Ac-
counting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 5 J. CoRP. LAW 1 (1979).
2 See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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briefly examines some key legal standards against which the effectiveness
of such a program is measured. Second, it considers the process by which a
compliance program is designed. Third, the three basic components of such
a program - a corporate policy, control procedures, and monitoring - are
addressed.
II. LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
Several bodies of law should be considered in determining whether to
adopt an FCPA compliance program and, if so, what it should contain. The
most obvious legal predicate for a compliance program is the FCPA itself.
The program should be designed based on the extent to which the com-
pany's activities present risks of violations of the statutory prohibitions. In
addition, developments related to the obligations of officers and directors
generally may bear on the decision to create an FCPA compliance program.
A. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
A comprehensive description of the anti-bribery provisions of the
FCPA is beyond the scope of this article. Set forth below, however, is an
overview of basic issues of importance to the architect of a compliance pro-
gram.
1. To Whom Does the FCPA Apply?
There are two parts to the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.3 Sec-
tion 103 of the FCPA, which is codified as Section 30A of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), 4 applies to public companies. For
these purposes, a "public company" is an issuer of a class of securities reg-
istered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act or required to file reports with
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") under Section 15(d) of
that Act by virtue of having made a public offering of securities. Section
30A prohibits any such company, or any officer, director, employee, or
agent of such a company, from making payments to certain foreign persons
or entities for the purpose of assisting the company in obtaining or retaining
business with, or directing business to, any person.5
Similarly, Section 104 of the FCPA prohibits "domestic concerns"
from making such payments.6 The term "domestic concern" includes any
citizen, resident, or national of the United States and any corporation, part-
3Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, as amended
by Title V of the Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§
5001-03, 102 Stat. 1415, 1415-25 (codified as amended at 15. U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2),
78m(b)(3), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff(1994)).4Section 30A(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (1994) [herein-
after Exchange Act].51d.
615 U.S.C. § 78dd-2. Section 104 is not codified as part of the Exchange Act.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 18:282 (1998)
nership, association, stock company, business trust, unincorporated organi-
zation, or sole proprietorship which is organized under the laws of the
United States (or a state) or which has its principal place of business in the
United States.7 Therefore, the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA apply to
both publicly-held and private U.S. companies and to all U.S. citizens or
residents.
2. What Types of Transactions Does the FCPA Prohibit?
The Act prohibits public companies and domestic concerns from "cor-
ruptly" making certain payments to assist in obtaining or retaining business.
Such payments are prohibited if made to any one of three categories of per-
sons. First, payments to foreign governmental officials are unlawful if
they are made for the purpose of influencing any act or decision of the re-
cipient in his or her official capacity, inducing him or her to omit to perform
any act in violation of his or her duty, or using his or her influence to affect
government decisions.9 Second, payments to foreign political parties or of-
ficials are unlawful if made for the purpose of influencing any act or deci-
sion made by the recipient in an official capacity, inducing an omission to
act, or inducing the recipient to use influence with his or her government.10
Finally, it is unlawful to make such a payment to any person, while
"knowing" that all or a portion of the payment will be offered, given, or
promised, directly or indirectly, to a foreign governmental or political offi-
cial for the purposes outlined above.11 The Act defines the term "foreign
official" to include officers and employees of a foreign government, or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof (or any person acting in an
official capacity on behalf of such a foreign department, agency, or instru-
mentality).
12
3. When Does a Company "Know" That a Payment Will be Made to a
Foreign Official or Other Prohibited Recipient?
The FCPA defines a person's state of mind to be "knowing" with re-
spect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, if such person is aware of the
715 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1).
8Exchange Act § 30A(a)(1)-(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd- 1(a)(1)-(3); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1)-
(3).
9Exchange Act § 30A(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(1).
10 Exchange Act § 30A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(2).
"Exchange Act § 30A(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(3); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(3).
12Exchange Act § 30A(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2). There
is no guidance in the statute or the legislative history as to what constitutes an agency or in-
strumentality of a foreign government. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1602 et seq. (1994), defines the term "agency or instrumentality of a foreign government" to
include commercial enterprises, more than 50% of the equity of which is owned by a foreign
government. If this definition of "agency or instrumentality of a foreign government" is ap-
plicable in the context of the FCPA, payments to employees of state-owned commercial en-
terprises are within the prohibitions of the Act.
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conduct, circumstance, or result or has a "firm belief' that the circumstance
exists or that the result is substantially likely to occur. 13 In addition, knowl-
edge is established when a person is aware of a "high probability" that a
circumstance, such as a prohibited payment, has or will occur, unless the
person "actually believes" that such circumstance does not exist.14 While
this definition is complex, the result is that "knowledge" includes not only
actual knowledge of prohibited payments, but also awareness of circum-
stances that should reasonably alert one to a "high probability" of a viola-
tion. 5
4. When is a Payment Considered to be Made "Corruptly" and for the
Purpose of "Obtaining or Retaining Business "?
The FCPA is aimed against attempts to obtain business through influ-
ence-buying abroad. The legislative history indicates that the word "cor-
ruptly" adds an element of intent to the violation and "connotes an evil
motive or purpose."' 6 Further, since the statute requires that the payment be
made in order to assist "in obtainin6 or retaining business for or with, or di-
recting business to, any person,"' only payments which are related to
commercial activity are prohibited. The purpose for which a payment is
made is, therefore, critical in determining whether the Act has been vio-
lated. A payment to an official in the government procurement department,
which is intended to influence that official to award a contract to the payor,
would certainly violate the Act. Payments related to foreign taxes or to in-
fluence the general political climate in a foreign country may be more argu-
able. The safest assumption, however, is that any "corrupt" payment to a
prohibited recipient will raise serious FCPA issues.
13Exchange Act § 30A(f)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(2)(A); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
2(h)(3)(A).
1
4 Exchange Act § 30A(f0(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(2)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
2(h)(3)(B).
15 "When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required for an of-
fense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the exis-
tence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circumstance does
not exist." Exchange Act § 30A(f)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
2(h)(3)(B).
The Conference Report on the 1988 amendments indicates that this knowledge standard
encompasses a "conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth." H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at
919 (1988) reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1949, 1952. Therefore, the disregard of circum-
stances that should alert one to bribery constitutes "knowledge" of such bribery:
[T]he Conferees also agreed that the so-called 'head-in-the-sand' problem -- variously
described in the pertinent authorities as 'conscious disregard,' 'willful blindness,' or
'deliberate ignorance' -- should be covered so that management officials could not take
refuge from the Act's prohibitions by their unwarranted obliviousness to any action (or
inaction), language or other 'signaling device' that should reasonably alert them of the
'high probability' of an FCPA violation.
H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 920 (1988) reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1949, 1953.
16S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977) reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098,4108.
17Exchange Act § 30A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a).
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5. Are "Facilitating Payments " of the Type that are Necessary in Some
Countries to Induce Government Functionaries to Perform Their Duties
Prohibited?
Payments to foreign officials that are intended to encourage those offi-
cials to perform a routine governmental action (referred to euphemistically
in the FCPA as "facilitating payments") are specifically excluded from the
prohibitions of the Act. 18 A routine governmental action is defined as an
action ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in connec-
tion with such things as issuing permits, licenses, or other official docu-
ments to qualify a person to do business; processing governmental papers
such as visas and work orders; providing police protection; mail pick-up
and delivery, or scheduling inspections; providing phone service, power and
water supply, loading and unloading cargo; and similar actions.19 However,
any decision by a foreign official to award new business to, or to continue
business with, a particular person, or to take any action involved in the de-
cision-making process "to encourage a decision to award new business or to
continue business" is excluded from the definition of routine governmental
action.20 Reliance on this exclusion from the Act should, therefore, be lim-
ited. Under some circumstances, it may be difficult to determine whether a
particular action is "ordinarily and commonly performed" or whether it
could be deemed part of the "decision-making processes."
6. How Is the Line Drawn Between Legitimate Payments to Foreign Offi-
cials and Bribes?
Payments which are lawful under the "written laws and regulations" to
which the foreign official is subject are not prohibited.2 ' Further, "reason-
able and bona fide" expenditures, such as payments for travel or lodging,
and payments directly related to the promotion or demonstration of prod-
ucts or services or to the performance of a contract with a foreign govern-
ment or agency are permitted.22
18 Exchange Act § 30A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b).
19Exchange Act § 30A(f)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd- l(f)(3)(A); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
2(h)(4)(A).20Exchange Act § 30A(f)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd- l(f)(3)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
2(h)(4)(B).
21 Exchange Act § 30A(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(1). The
legislative history of the 1988 Amendments to the Act states that, in order for this exception
to be available, the action in question must be specifically permitted under such written laws
and regulations; the absence of a prohibition is not sufficient. H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at
922, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1949, 1955.
2 2Exchange Act § 30A(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(2).
Designing an FCPA Compliance Program
18:282 (1998)
7. Is a Company That Is Subject to the FCPA Also Liable for Violations
Committed by its Foreign Subsidiaries?
The House version of the legislation that enacted the FCPA would
have extended the anti-bribery prohibition to subsidiaries controlled (by
virtue of a fifty percent or greater ownership interest) by a domestic con-
cern. While this provision was deleted from the bill, the legislative history
makes clear that domestic concerns may be vicariously liable for bribes
paid on their behalf by other entities under certain circumstances. The Con-
ference Committee Report states:
In receding to the Senate [i.e., omitting the House provision regarding subsidi-
aries], the conferees recognized the inherent jurisdictional, enforcement, and
diplomatic difficulties raised by the inclusion of foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
companies in the direct prohibitions of the bill. However, the conferees intend
to make clear that any issuer or domestic concern which engages in bribery of
foreign officials indirectly through any other person or entity would itself be
liable under the bill. 23
8. What are the Consequences of a Violation of the Act?
Penalties for violating the anti-bribery provisions of the Act are severe.
Public companies are subject to criminal fines of not more than $2,000,000
per violation. 4 Such companies are also subject to civil fines of up to
$10,000 in actions brought by the SEC.2 5 Any officer or director of the
company, or a stockholder acting on behalf of the company, and any em-
ployee or agent who is a U.S. citizen, resident, or national or is otherwise
subject to U.S. jurisdiction, may be criminally fined not more than
$100,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, for a willful vio-
lation. 6 These persons are also subject to a civil penalty in an SEC action
of not more than $10,000.27 The FCPA expressly prohibits the company
from paying any such fine levied on an individual associated with the com-
pany.28 The SEC also can bring a civil action to obtain an injunction against
future violations, or commence administrative cease and desist proceedings
against a public company or persons who caused such a company to violate
Section 30A.29
Domestic concerns (including all U.S. citizens and residents) that are
not within the SEC's jurisdiction are subject to a similar body of sanc-
2H.R. Rep. No. 95-831, at 14 (1997) reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4121, 4126 (em-
phasis added).24Exchange Act § 32(c)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(1)(A).
25Exchange Act § 32(c)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(1)(B).26Exchange Act § 32(c)(2)(A) and (B), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(2)(A) & (B).
27Exchange Act § 32(c)(1)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(1)(C).28Exchange Act § 32(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(3).
29See Exchange Act §§ 21, 21B, 21C, 15 U.S.C. §§78u, 78u-2, 78u-3.
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tions.3° The U.S. Attorney General, rather than the SEC, has the responsi-
bility for civil actions against such companies and persons.3'
B. Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
One of the greatest incentives to formulating a corporate compliance
program is the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.3  Chapter Eight of the
Guidelines, "Sentencing of Organizations" (hereinafter "Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines"), embodies various principles, including that "the
fine range for any other organization should be based on the seriousness of
the offense and the culpability of the organization., 33 Culpability, in turn,
depends in part on "the steps taken by the organization prior to the offense
to prevent and detect criminal conduct [and] the level and extent of in-
volvement in or tolerance of the offense by certain personnel * ** . "34 Un-
der this philosophy, an organization's culpability score is reduced if "the
offense occurred despite an effective program to prevent and detect viola-
tions of law., 35 The benefit of this reduction may, however, be lost if a
"high level" official of the organization or an official responsible for the
administration of the program participated in, condoned, or willfully ig-
nored the violation.36 The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines define the
phrase "effective program to prevent and detect violations of law" as -
a program that has been reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so
that it generally will be effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct.
Failure to prevent or detect the instant offense, by itself, does not mean that the
program was not effective. The hallmark of an effective program to prevent
and detect violations of law is that the organization exercised due diligence in
seeking to prevent and detect criminal conduct by its employees and other
agents.37
The guidelines also set forth seven steps that "at a minimum" the or-
ganization must take in order to satisfy the due diligence requirement.
These seven steps are listed below.
38
30 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g).
3 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(d)(1), 78dd-2(g)(1)(B), 78dd- 2(g)(2)(C).32 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8 (1997) [hereinafter USSG].





37 USSG § 8A1.2, application note 3(k) (emphasis added) (Application note 3(k) is here-
inafter referred to as "Organizational Sentencing Guidelines Note (3)(k)").
38Id. Organizational Sentencing Guidelines Note (3)(k) also includes the caveat that the
"precise actions necessary for an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law
will depend upon a number of factors" including the size of the organization; the likelihood
that certain offenses may occur because of the nature of its business; and the prior history of
the organization. Moreover, "failure to incorporate and follow applicable industry practice
or the standards called for by any applicable governmental regulation weighs against a find-
ing of an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law." Id.
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(1) The organization must have established compliance standards and
procedures to be followed by its employees and other agents that are
reasonably capable of reducing the prospect of criminal conduct.39
This element would seem to require a statement of corporate policy
(i.e., a "compliance standard") explaining the prohibitions of the FCPA and
setting forth the company's expectation that employees will refrain from
violations. Whether such a code of conduct alone is "reasonably capable of
reducing the prospect" of violations will depend on the nature of the com-
pany's activities, past history of questionable payments, and other factors.
(2) Specific individual(s) within high-level personnel of the organiza-
tion must have been assigned overall responsibility to oversee compli-
ance with such standards and procedures.40
"High-level personnel of the organization" means "individuals who
have substantial control over the organization or who have a substantial role
in the making of policy within the organization." '' Directors, executive of-
ficers, and individuals in charge of a major business or functional unit of
the organization are included within the concept of "high-level person-
nel. '' 2 In many cases, the General Counsel is designated as the company's
compliance officer. It may, however, be prudent to appoint a committee of
senior personnel, including the General Counsel, in the event that judg-
ments concerning the application of the FCPA are expected to arise fre-
quently. Moreover, in the event that the company has decentralized
management and numerous locations, it may be desirable to delegate re-
sponsibility for administration of the FCPA compliance program to senior
personnel at various locations.
(3) The organization must have used due care not to delegate substan-
tial discretionary authority to individuals whom the organization knew,
or should have known through the exercise of due diligence, had a pro-
pensity to engage in illegal activities.43
Persons found to have intentionally engaged in questionable foreign
payments should not be left in positions that would permit them to repeat
their conduct. Presumably, cases of serious and intentional violation would
normally result in termination. In other cases, such as small payments
made in violation of company policy but arguably within the "facilitating
payment" exception to the FCPA, the institution of controls designed to
prevent a repetition (i.e., controls that deprive the individual of "substantial
discretionary authority" with respect to such matters) may be appropriate.
39USSG §8AI.2, application note 3(k)(1).
4
1USSG §8AI.2, application note 3(k)(2).
41USSG §8A1.2, application note 3(b).
42ad.
413USSG §8A1.2, application note 3(k)(3).
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(4) The organization must have taken steps to communicate effectively
its standards and procedures to all employees and other agents, e.g., by
requiring participation in training programs or by disseminating publi-
cations that explain in a practical manner what is required."
The company's code of conduct or policy statement should be dis-
seminated throughout the organization. It may also be appropriate to re-
quire employees (or at least employees in certain categories) to certify
periodically in writing that they have read the policy, had the opportunity to
ask questions, and understand it. It is also desirable to conduct periodic
training programs concerning the requirements of the FCPA and the com-
pany's policy, especially for employees based in foreign countries or who
otherwise are likely to encounter FCPA issues. Periodic dissemination of
updating information concerning the FCPA, such as news reports of law en-
forcement proceedings, also evidence an effort to satisfy this due diligence
factor.
(5) The organization must have taken reasonable steps to achieve com-
pliance with its standards, e.g., by utilizing monitoring and auditing
systems reasonably designed to detect criminal conduct by its employ-
ees and other agents and by having in place and publicizing a reporting
system whereby employees and other agents could report criminal
conduct by others within the organization without fear of retribution.'a
This factor makes clear that mere promulgation of a compliance pro-
gram, without follow-up, is not sufficient. Monitoring and auditing are dis-
cussed in detail below.
(6) The standards must have been consistently enforced through appro-
priate disciplinary mechanisms, including, as appropriate, discipline of
individuals responsible for the failure to detect an offense. Adequate
discipline of individuals responsible for an offense is a necessary com-
ponent of enforcement; however, the form of discipline that will be ap-
propriate will be case specific.
46
It is important that the company demonstrate a commitment to enforc-
ing its policy. When violations are discovered, appropriate action should be
taken against those involved. Not every violation may necessarily justify
termination of the offender. Depending upon the circumstances, sanctions
such as suspension, demotion, forfeiture of a portion of pay, reprimand, or
reassignment may be sufficient to demonstrate that the company takes its
policy seriously. If instances of possible violations of the policy are inves-
tigated and no action is taken against those involved, the reasons for that re-
sult should be documented.
44USSG §8A1.2, application note 3(k)(4).45USSG §8A1.2, application note 3(k)(5).
46 USSG §8A1.2, application note 3(k)(6).
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(7) After an offense has been detected, the organization must have
taken all reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the offense and to
prevent further similar offenses - including any necessary modifica-
tions to its program to prevent and detect violations of law.
47
Whenever a violation of the policy comes to light, the compliance pro-
gram should be reviewed with a view to determining why the violation oc-
curred and whether changes should be made in the program to prevent a
reoccurrence. At the same time, it is important to recognize that no compli-
ance program, in any field, can prevent a determined group of employees
from engaging in misconduct. A program that tries to impose controls on
every conceivable activity that might result in misconduct is likely to prove
unwieldy and, in the long run, unenforceable.
C. Directors' Fiduciary Responsibilities
While the potentially severe consequences of FCPA violations and the
potential Organizational Sentencing Guidelines benefits of an effective
compliance program are the dominant reasons to implement an FCPA com-
pliance program, other factors may also come into play. In particular, the
Delaware Court of Chancery has recently suggested that directors of Dela-
ware corporations have a fiduciary duty to monitor corporate activities with
a view to detecting unlawful conduct.48 In order to discharge this duty,
adoption of a compliance program in areas where there is a risk of viola-
tions would seem to be necessary. Similarly, the SEC has suggested in
certain enforcement proceedings that corporate officers and directors who
are on notice of possible violations of the securities laws have an obligation,
enforceable in SEC proceedings, to take steps to investigate and prevent
any further violations from occurring.49
1. Directors' Fiduciary Duty to Adopt a Program of
Corporate Compliance
The recent Caremark decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery sug-
gests that corporate directors have an affirmative duty to implement a com-
pliance program to detect violations of law. 0 In Caremark, a derivative
action was brought against the members of the company's board of direc-
tors to recover criminal and civil fines paid by the company as a result of
violations by company employees of certain federal and state laws applica-
ble to healthcare providers. The directors were not alleged to have con-
doned or authorized the violations; rather, they were alleged to have
breached their fiduciary duty of care by failing to learn of the unlawful ac-
tivity and by failing to adequately control Caremark's employees. In the
47 USSG §8A1.2, application note 3(k)(7).
4 8 See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
49 See infra Part II.C.2.
50 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967-70.
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course of considering whether a proposed settlement of this action was fair
and reasonable, the court considered whether directors have a legally en-
forceable obligation to monitor and detect violations of law by corporate
employees. Chancellor Allen concluded:
Thus, I am of the view that a director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in
good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which
the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under some
circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses caused
by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.5 '
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines "offer powerful incentives for corporations today to
have in place compliance programs to detect violations of law, promptly to
report violations to appropriate public officials, when discovered, and to
take prompt, voluntary remedial efforts.' 's
2. Securities Law Duty to Address Known Risks of Misconduct
The SEC has not yet directly taken the position that officers and di-
rectors who fail to implement a compliance program are themselves liable
to SEC enforcement action if the company engages in violations of the law.
There are, however, two recent enforcement proceedings that strongly sug-
gest that SEC action may result where directors or officers are on notice of
the possibility of securities law violations and fail to take prompt corrective
actions. These proceedings are discussed below.
In In re Cooper Companies, the SEC issued a "Report of Investiga-
tion" concerning the conduct of the board of directors of Cooper.53 In es-
sence, the Commission found that the directors had failed to take action
despite information that the senior officials of the company had engaged in
fraudulent and manipulative trading in certain securities issued by the com-
pany. The SEC Report describes the board's failure to promptly inquire
into these matters and to remove the offenders from positions in which they
could issue public statements on behalf of the company as a failure to fulfill
the board's "obligations under the federal securities laws when confronted
with evidence of serious wrongdoing by persons it continued to entrust with
day-to-day management of the company.6 4 The SEC concluded:
The Commission considers it essential for board members to move aggres-
sively to fulfill their responsibilities to oversee the conduct and performance of
management and to ensure that the company's public statements are candid
and complete. The Commission has long viewed the issue of corporate gov-
ernance and the fiduciary obligations of members of management and the
boards of directors of public companies to their investors as an issue of para-
5lId. at 970.
52 d. at 969.53Cooper Cos. Report, Exchange Act Release No. 35082, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85472, at 86,061 (Dec. 12, 1994).
54 1d. at 86,062.
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mount importance to the integrity and soundness of our capital markets. These
obligations are particularly acute where potential violations of the federal secu-
rities laws involving self-dealing and fraud by management are called to the
attention of the board of directors."
Recently, the SEC reiterated this point in In the Matter of W.R. Grace
& Co.56 That case involved a company's alleged failure to disclose benefits
paid to a retired chief executive officer and a related party transaction be-
tween a senior official and the company. The SEC stated:
Serving as an officer or director of a public company is a privilege which car-
ries with it substantial obligations. If an officer or director knows or should
know that his or her company's statements concerning particular issues are in-
adequate or incomplete, he or she has an obligation to correct that failure. An
officer or director may rely upon the company's procedures for determining
what disclosure is required only if he or she has a reasonable basis for believ-
ing that those procedures have resulted in full consideration of those issues.
5 7
While these cases involve disclosure violations,58 it may not be a long
step to the conclusion that the same reasoning could be applied to violations
of Section 30A of the Exchange Act. And, as the W.R. Grace report sug-
gests, the Commission may also be moving in the same direction as the
Delaware Chancery Court - both the court and the SEC have indicated
that directors are obligated not only to take steps to terminate violations
when they come to the directors' attention, but also to have procedures in
place to detect and prevent violations before occurrence.5 9 The balance of
this article considers the process by which such a program may be designed
with respect to the FCPA.
II. DESIGNING AN FCPA COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
In order to design an effective FCPA compliance program, several ba-
sic categories of information concerning the company and its operations
must first be compiled. Even when the program designer is a company in-
sider with intimate knowledge of the company, it may be useful for him or
her to review and consider, in an organized manner, the environment in
which the company operates and what the risks of questionable payments in
that environment are. If the program is designed by counsel or other out-
side consultants, the need to gather information so that the program is prop-
erly tailored to the company is obvious.
"Id. at 86,065.56W.R. Grace & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 39157, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 85963, at 89,889 (Sept. 30, 1997).
171d. at 89,897.
58But see John H. Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 31554, [1992 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,067, at 83,597 (Dec. 3, 1992) (failure of senior officials of a
brokerage firm to act promptly after learning of violations related to Treasury auction proce-
dures and limitations by a trader constituted a breach of senior officials' supervisory duties).
59See notes 41-43, 44-49 and accompanying text.
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Three basic kinds of information need to be collected - the risks of
FCPA violations, the existing controls, and the resources and commitment
available to administer and monitor the program. Armed with this infor-
mation, the program architect should identify explicitly the objectives that
he or she seeks to accomplish through the compliance program.
A. Identifying Risks
The most basic step in designing an FCPA compliance program is to
determine the risks against which such a program is intended to protect. It
is therefore necessary to gain an understanding of how and where the com-
pany does business abroad. A company with few foreign operations or that
does business only in jurisdictions in which bribery is unlikely to occur,
faces a far different task in designing a compliance program than does one
whose business is dependent on the award of government contracts in a ju-
risdiction where bribery is endemic.
The first step in this process is to review the basic sources of informa-
tion that describe the company's foreign operations and the circumstances
under which the company has contact with, or requires action or approval
by, foreign officials. The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines suggest
that the failure to perform this type of risk analysis can be fatal to the effec-
tiveness of the plan. "If because of the nature of an organization's business
there is a substantial risk that certain types of offenses may occur, manage-
ment must have taken steps to prevent and detect those types of offenses."60
Such sources include SEC filings and other descriptions of the company's
business operations; interviews with corporate officials; and securities ana-
lysts' reports, news articles, and other published sources of information.
The compliance planner should learn the location, nature, and scope of for-
eign operations; the legal form in which the company conducts off-shore
operations (e.g., through branches, subsidiaries, independent sales agents,
or joint ventures); how and by whom foreign operations are managed; and
the extent to which the company conducts operations in jurisdictions that
could be viewed as "high risk" for FCPA violations.
While caution needs to be used so that the process of designing a com-
pliance program does not evolve into an investigation of possible past mis-
conduct,6' one aspect of understanding the risks that the program should
address is uncovering any examples of questionable foreign payments sus-
6 0USSG § 8A1.2, application note 3(k)(ii).
61 Different considerations concerning attorney-client privilege, the rights of employees,
the results and documentation of the inquiry, and other matters apply to investigations of
specific past events of misconduct. Although beyond the scope of this article, much has
been written about the conduct of an internal investigation. See, e.g., Ralph C. Ferrara et al.,
Internal Corporate Investigations and the SEC's Message to Directors in Cooper Co., 65 U.
CN. L. REv. 75 (1996); Robert J. Bush, Comment, Stimulating Corporate Self-Regulation --
The Corporate Self-Evaluative Privilege: Paradigmatic Preferentialism or Pragmatic Pana-
cea, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 597 (1993).
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pected by management or previously identified by governmental authori-
ties. Further, if the company has previously been involved in any formal
U.S. or foreign proceeding in which it was alleged that bribery occurred, the
circumstances obviously must be thoroughly reviewed and procedures de-
signed to prevent a repetition of this event.62
More frequently, however, corporate officials may merely have suspi-
cions concerning particular activities, jurisdictions, or transactions that
could lend themselves to questionable payments. Interviews with working-
level employees may, for example, produce information that is not obvious
from a review of documents and procedures. Depending on the situation, it
may therefore be appropriate to visit foreign operations and interview local
personnel.
B. Assessing Existing Controls
After the basic risks to which the company is subject have been deter-
mined, existing controls relevant to preventing and detecting improper
payments should be inventoried. In some cases, the creation of a compli-
ance program may consist largely of drafting a policy and collecting all of
the existing controls and procedures designed to prevent illicit payments in
a single document. These could include accounting controls designed to
prevent the creation of unaccountable assets pools; approval procedures for
the retention of agents; standard terms concerning FCPA compliance in
agency, joint venture, and similar contracts; and comparable measures.
Conversely, the process of identifying existing controls may expose the
need for additional controls. One possible source of information as to
weaknesses or control failures is the outside auditor's internal control letter.
Typically, the outside auditors of a public company will furnish the com-
pany with a letter summarizing the auditor's review of accounting controls,
identifying weaknesses or deficiencies, and recommending specific correc-
tions. As noted above, in enacting the FCPA, Congress both prohibited for-
eign bribery and broadly required that public companies maintain accurate
books and records and establish adequate internal accounting controls.63
While the design of a system of internal accounting controls is beyond the
scope of this article, the existence of such a system is both a legal require-
ment and a cornerstone of an anti-bribery compliance program. The accu-
racy and adequacy of record-keeping and internal controls are key
components of any effort to prevent or detect questionable foreign pay-
ments.
If additional procedural controls are needed, it is important that new
procedures not overlap with or contradict existing controls. FCPA compli-
62"An organization's prior history may indicate types of offenses that it should have
taken actions to prevent. Recurrence of misconduct similar to that which an organization has
previously committed casts doubt on whether it took all reasonable steps to prevent such
misconduct." USSG § SAL.2, application note 3(k)(iii).63USSG § 8A1.2, application note 3(k)(2); see supra Part II.A.2.
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ance procedures should mesh smoothly with existing processes for obtain-
ing approval for the retention of consultants, approval of cash expenditures,
and similar activities.
C. Considering Available Resources
In designing a compliance program, it also is necessary to consider
who will be responsible for implementing the program and what resources
- in both money and management time - will be necessary to administer
it. There needs to be a realistic assessment of whether the personnel re-
sponsible for implementing the program will be able to do so, consistent
with the discharge of their other duties. The most thoughtfully designed
and engineered program, if not enforced or applied, is as bad as no program
at all. Therefore, the program needs to match not only the risks of the busi-
ness, but also the capabilities and resources of those who will be imple-
menting it.
The commentary concerning effective compliance programs in the Or-
ganizational Sentencing Guidelines calls for "high-level~personnel" to be
assigned "overall responsibility to oversee compliance." In practice, this
often means that the company's General Counsel is designated as the ex-
ecutive responsible for compliance matters, including FCPA compliance. If
the compliance program calls for pre-approval of contracts with foreign
agents or consultants, approval of particular types of expenditures, or simi-
lar recurring actions, it may also be necessary to assign lower-level person-
nel to process these actions under the supervision of the executive with
overall responsibility. Care needs to be taken at both ends of the spectrum:
Senior officials assigned responsibility for the program must have a will-
ingness and commitment to treat this duty as a priority. More junior em-
ployees must be properly trained and have a thorough understanding of
what is expected of them.
D. Defining Objectives
Once these basic categories of information have been collected, the
next step in developing a compliance program is to define the program's
scope and objectives. While programs vary widely and must of course be
tailored to the company's circumstances, FCPA compliance programs typi-
cally attempt to address one or a combination of three broad objectives -
documentation of company policy and education of employees, imposition
of procedural controls, and monitoring of compliance.
Documentation and Education. The core of most FCPA compliance
programs is a statement of corporate policy. This statement typically
describes the requirements of the FCPA and expresses the company's
commitment to avoiding practices that could constitute violations.
Such a policy statement documents that the company has considered
64USSG § 8A1.2, application note 3(k)(2); see supra Part II.B.2.
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the FCPA and alerted its employees to the importance of adherence
thereto. Depending on the level of detail, the policy may also serve to
inform or educate employees concerning prohibited practices.
Procedural Controls To Promote Compliance. Procedural controls, as
discussed above, are designed to address the specific types of foreign
activities in which the company engages and to impose checks or
limitations on those which pose risks of violation.
Monitoring. Monitoring procedures should be devised to periodically
verify compliance with the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA and
with the company's policy in high-risk areas of the business.
IV. ELEMENTS OF AN FCPA POLICY
An effective FCPA compliance program need not necessarily include
any specific set of features. The program must, however, be carefully tai-
lored to the company's unique circumstances and to the specific risks that
employees, agents, affiliates, or others empowered to act on the company's
behalf will engage in the kind of conduct prohibited by the FCPA. Moreo-
ver, this is a field in which too much may be more harmful than too little.
A program that includes procedures and controls which are not followed in
practice may prove to be an aggravating, rather than a mitigating, factor in
the event of an FCPA violation. With these caveats in mind, set forth be-
low are some features which may be considered for inclusion in an FCPA
compliance program.
A. Statement of Corporate Policy
The first and most common component of a compliance program is a
statement of corporate policy or a "code of conduct" that sets forth the
company's expectation that employees will strictly adhere to the law.65 Es-
pecially in the case of a large organization, such a policy statement is im-
66perative. The policy would generally include a description of the
prohibitions in the FCPA, possibly with supporting detail or examples rele-
vant to the company's activities. The policy should also describe the ac-
counting provisions of the FCPA and set forth the company's expectation
that all employees will adhere to the requirement that corporate books and
records be accurate.
65In many cases, a company may adopt separate codes of conduct or separate chapters or
sections in an overall compliance manual to deal with different compliance issues, such as
FCPA, antitrust, insider trading, anti-discrimination, environmental compliance, etc. In
other cases, all of these topics may be combined in a single, comprehensive code.
6 1USSG § 8A1.2, application note 3(k)(i):
The requisite degree of formality of a program to prevent and detect violations of law
will vary with the size of the organization: the larger the organization, the more formal
the program typically should be. A larger organization generally should have estab-
lished written policies defining the standards and procedures to be followed by its em-
ployees and other agents.
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In addition to educating employees concerning the applicable legal re-
quirements, the policy statement may also include other types of informa-
tion. For example -
Assignment of Compliance Responsibilities. The policy statement
may include a statement of the assignment of responsibilities within
the company for addressing questions that arise under the FCPA. If a
compliance committee has been formed, its membership should be
identified. If the General Counsel, or another senior official, is the fo-
cal point for FCPA compliance, that fact should be made clear.
Documenting the Corporate Culture. The policy statement should also
serve as a reflection of senior management's commitment to FCPA
compliance and evidence of the corporate compliance culture.
Gathering Information. The policy statement should inform employ-
ees concerning who should be contacted in the event that interpretive
issues or other questions arise and concerning whom should be in-
formed in the event that an employee believes that a violation has oc-
curred. Mechanisms, such as employee hot-lines and anonymous
reporting procedures, may also increase the likelihood that informa-
tion concerning nascent FCPA issues will come to management's at-
tention at an early stage.
Obviously, the creation and issuance of a policy statement is, in itself,
not effective to prevent or detect violations of the FCPA.67 At a minimum,
the policy must be disseminated widely throughout the organization, such
as by inclusion in employee handbooks or similar materials.68 Periodic
training concerning the FCPA and the company's compliance program may
be appropriate for certain categories of employees.
B. Control Procedures
The second component of a compliance program is the creation and
implementation of procedures designed to prevent violations of the law or
of the corporate policy. In many cases, a policy statement may be sufficient
as the company's FCPA compliance program. In cases where particular re-
curring situations arise in which there is a greater risk of FCPA violations
occurring, it may be desirable also to create specific internal controls as part
of the program. Such procedures might include due diligence with respect
to agents, consultants, joint venturers, and other foreign partners; certifica-
tions or similar mechanisms to provide evidence that employees are aware
of and have adhered to corporate policy; and devices to bring violations to
management's attention.
Some examples of procedural controls include-
67See id. application note 3(k)(4).68 Id"
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1. Contractual Terms
Consultants or agents involved in foreign operations or based outside
the United States may be required to execute a contract containing FCPA
compliance requirements. Such contractual terms should clearly and une-
quivocally indicate that the consultant or agent is prohibited from making
any payments in violation of the FCPA on behalf of the company or in the
course of acting on behalf of the company.
2. Expenditure Controls
Cash expenditures over a certain level may require special approvals
and standardized documentation. Stricter approval requirements, or lower
approval thresholds, may be applied in particular foreign jurisdictions.
Documentation may be required for all such cash expenditures and specific
procedures may apply to the retention of such documentation.
3. Due Diligence
A procedure for performing due diligence with respect to foreign
agents, consultants, distributors, joint venture partners, investees, acquirees,
and similar persons or entities that have relationships with the company and
are involved in its foreign operations should be considered.69 Whether such
a person's improper payments would legally be attributable to the company
depends on the circumstances of each situation. It is, however, usually pru-
dent to develop information concerning the other party to such relationships
in order to assess whether it is prudent to do business with that party.
Prospective agents might, for example, be required to provide re-
sponses to a standard list of questions, including such matters as educa-
tional and business background; identity of other clients; existence of any
family or business relationship with government officials; credit and per-
sonal references; or prior involvement in criminal or regulatory proceed-
ings. In addition to obtaining information directly from the individual, due
diligence with respect to the retention of an agent could include a review of
publicly available data sources, such as business directories, online infor-
mation services, or the Internet.
Another facet of due diligence with respect to agents is to determine
whether the fees to be charged are reasonable, relative to comparable serv-
ices offered by others in the local market. If agents are entitled to reim-
bursement for expenses, a mechanism should be in place to require
supporting documentation. In general, precautions should be taken to re-
duce the likelihood that the agent will receive or have access to company
69In the author's view, the extent to which a U.S. company would have FCPA liability
for payments made by a distributor of its products or ajoint venture partner would depend on
the facts and circumstances of the relationship. Prudence may, however, dictate that dis-
tributors and joint venture partners be subjected to the same due diligence procedures as are
agents.
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funds that might be shared with government officials. In this regard, com-
missions based on a percentage of business generated or by a similar ar-
rangement require close scrutiny.
4. Certifications
As noted above, certain categories of employees may be required to
certify periodically that they have reviewed the corporate FCPATpolicy and
have not engaged in and are not aware of any violations thereof. In some
cases, similar certifications by agents or joint venturers may be appropriate.
Where certifications are required, a penalty - such as dismissal or termi-
nation of contract - should be provided in the event that a certification is
later discovered to be false.
5. Facilitating Payment Procedures
A methodology for obtaining approval and documenting payments that
raise FCPA "red flags," but are deemed to be legal, may be desirable in
situations in which such payments are common. Recurrent payments to se-
cure the performance of ministerial actions,71 payments to governmental of-
ficials that are lawful under the written law of the foreign jurisdiction,72 and
legitimate travel and entertainment expenses of foreign officials,73 may jus-
tify a standardized approval and documentation process if they occur fre-
quently.
C. Monitoring Mechanisms
The third component of a compliance program is a mechanism to
monitor the implementation of the program. As discussed earlier, the Or-
ganizational Sentencing Guidelines contemplate "steps to achieve compli-
ance ... e.g., by utilizing monitoring and auditing systems reasonably
designed to detect criminal conduct."74 The nature and extent of monitoring
mechanisms adopted will depend on the company's specific circumstances
and its assessment of the level of violation risk.
"Monitoring" is often considered a responsibility of the internal audit
staff. Internal auditors may indeed include among their procedures steps to
determine whether procedural controls have been observed. Some other
steps that may be taken to monitor compliance with an FCPA compliance
program could include such things as -
70 See supra Part I1.B.4.
71 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
72See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
73See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
74USSG § 8A1.2, application note 3(k)(5).
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1. Review of Documentation Associated with Particular Transactions,
Contracts, or Other Events
Foreign contracts, bids, tax disputes, distributorship agreements, and
similar transactions that could be conducive to FCPA violations may be pe-
riodically reviewed to determine whether all relevant documentation is on
file and whether anything in the file suggests the need for further inquiry.
2. Interviews with Employees Involved in High-Risk Areas of Corporate
Activity
Periodic visits to foreign operations by internal auditors or staff mem-
bers with compliance responsibilities may include interviews with local
personnel during which such personnel are questioned concerning the exis-
tence of any circumstances suggesting FCPA violations.
3. Review of Supporting Documentation for Cash Expenditures
Similarly, audits of foreign locations normally include the review of
documentation supporting cash expenditures and checks written and
authorized locally. Auditors should insure that there is proper documenta-
tion on hand for all such payments. Any expenditures which appear to in-
volve direct or indirect payments to foreign officials should be the subject
of further inquiry.
4. Review of Consultants and Agents Contracts
As discussed earlier, due diligence should be performed with respect to
foreign agents, and such persons may be required to execute contracts obli-
gating them to comply with FCPA and company policies concerning pay-
ments to foreign officials. Files should be maintained documenting
compliance with these requirements with respect to each foreign agent or
other person covered by the policy that is retained, and these files should be
reviewed periodically for completeness and conformity to the policy.
5. Review of Public Information Concerning Business Practices in
Particular Jurisdictions
The official charged with administering the FCPA compliance program
should stay abreast of public information concerning business practices in
the jurisdictions where the company operates. News articles concerning
questionable payments involving competitors, or reflecting adversely on
agents retained by the company, could, for example, serve as an indication
of problems which could also affect the company.
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6. Review of Compliance with Periodic Certification Requirements
As has been discussed, some companies require all or some categories
of employees to certify that they have read the FCPA policy statement and
that they are not aware of any violations by any company personnel. 75 If
such a periodic certification procedure exists, the files should be reviewed
to ensure that it is actually being observed. Employees who have failed to
execute the certification should be contacted and their certification ob-
tained.
In some companies, the annual certification may take the form of a
more detailed questionnaire in which particular employees are asked to re-
spond to a series of questions concerning their involvement in or knowledge
of any improper payments, record-keeping inaccuracies, or other types of
misconduct. If such questionnaires exist, it is important that responses be
carefully reviewed and any unusual responses subjected to follow-up in-
quiry.
7. Report to the Board
In light of the increasing focus on board responsibility for corporate
compliance, the monitoring effort should include a periodic report to the
company's board of directors. The directors should receive information
concerning the results of monitoring, any recommended changes in the
compliance program, any suspected violations meriting further follow-up,
and any other matters arising out of the ongoing administration of the pro-
gram. Any suggestions or inquiries from the directors should, of course, be
pursued and resulting actions or changes documented.
V. CONCLUSION
The formulation of compliance programs has received increasing scru-
tiny in light of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. The Caremark
decision may serve to increase further interest in the development of such
programs. Similarly, the active SEC interest in FCPA enforcement, cou-
pled with the substantial penalties and reputational risks which can arise
from charges of foreign bribery, make FCPA compliance efforts an espe-
cially important focus for U.S. multinational companies. While a compli-
ance program in this field cannot be designed from a textbook, the approach
outlined in this article is intended to give the designer of such an FCPA
compliance program a framework within which to consider how best to
tailor that program to the needs and risks of his or her company.
75See supra Part II.B.4.
